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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the relationship between the legal forms adopted by microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their 
performance within three scopes: financial performance, social performance, and efficiency in resource allocation. The MFIs 
studied are classified into four groups: banks, non-governmental organizations, cooperatives, and a fourth group formed of 
for-profit institutions not characterized as banks, made up of non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) and rural banks. The 
data used are annual and cover the six years from 2007 to 2012. The quantitative regression model with panel data was used 
together with dummy variables to compare between the four groups of legal forms, except for the group made up of NBFIs 
and rural banks, which was not represented by any dummy variable. 304 MFIs from 59 countries made up the sample. In 
the study it was observed that larger MFIs have higher profits, higher returns, and higher operational self-sufficiency rates 
than smaller MFIs, indicating that MFI growth could enable consolidation in the microfinance market. The results also 
indicate that for smaller MFIs the way to consolidate and improve the indicators could be through assimilating or merging 
with other MFIs. It was also noted that non-bank financial institutions and rural banks are able to serve more customers 
and that cooperatives provide smaller loans, causing a bigger social impact, and that they obtain higher returns and profits. 
The results indicate that these legal forms may be the most appropriate for the microfinance market.
Keywords: microcredit, microfinance, legal form, ownership structure, financial performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Microfinance constitutes an incentive tool for micro 
and small enterprises that have little or no access to the 
traditional financial system, as well as a source of credit 
for people and communities in need that do not have 
sufficient resources to access the traditional financial 
system. Without microfinance institutions (MFIs), the 
sources of funds for this portion of the market would 
be limited to friends, family members, or loan sharks, 
which restricts entrepreneurial capacity and affects the 
quality of life of a portion of the population (Soares & 
Melo Sobrinho, 2008).
Due to the social appeal of microfinance, MFIs can 
receive resources from governments, investors, and 
donors. In exchange, it is hoped that they provide financial 
services to this market in such a way that the operation 
is sustainable both for the borrowers and for the MFIs 
themselves. In this context, efficient resource allocation 
is essential to guarantee cost reductions and survival in 
the microfinance market. Efficiency is also important so 
that investors, interested in maximizing profits, invest in 
MFIs with the aim of maximizing the financial return on 
their investment (Hermes & Lensink, 2011).
As the performance signaled by MFIs is a determinant 
for the market when it chooses which institutions to 
invest in, the factors that affect the performance of MFIs 
are quite extensively explored by the literature. Among 
the factors explored, the following bear mentioning: the 
subsidy effect (D’Espallier, Hudon, & Szafarz, 2013), 
the relationship between social orientation and efficiency 
(Louis, Seret, & Baesens, 2013), the macroeconomic 
context (Ahlin, Lin, & Maio, 2011), and the level of MFI 
governance (Hartarska, 2005).
This paper is based on the problem of separating 
the ownership and control of the capital allocated in 
organizations, known as the agency problem (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983a), as well as on the different implications 
resulting from the distinct legal forms for the appropriate 
allocation of invested resources, and on the right 
destination for possible surpluses obtained by MFIs (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983b). In this context, legal form comes to 
be observed as a determinant for agency cost and for 
MFI performance, given the demands of the market, 
of investors, donors, and governments, which invest 
resources in microfinance (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010).
This paper builds upon the study from Tchakoute-
Tchuigoua (2010), innovating on two points: by using 
control variables, MFI size and solvency ratio, and by 
separating banks from other for-profit MFIs. Separation 
is warranted because of the way rural banks and non-
bank financial institutions (NBFIs) operate, which is 
on a local scale and without the use of intermediaries, 
unlike big banks, which adopt structures centralized 
in urban centers and have difficulties serving distant 
communities without the use of intermediaries (Cyree & 
Spurlin, 2012). The study also differentiates itself by using 
a subsequent time period, updating the results found by 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010), and applying the panel 
data regression technique to deal with the time period 
and with the variables used.  
304 MFIs were analyzed, operating between 2007 
and 2012 and with data available in MixMarket (2014), a 
database in which financial and institutional information 
is found related to institutions that provide microcredit. 
The study aims to improve our understanding of how legal 
form influences the performance and actions of MFIs.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 MFI Performance
In the credit market, the niche made up of the poorest 
customers was traditionally ignored by banks and financial 
institutions until the emergence of MFIs, since in order 
to serve this market niche institutions face relatively 
higher operating and administrative costs due to the 
amounts of credit required, which are smaller than those 
of richer customers (Kent & Dacin, 2013). In order to 
avoid charging customers high interest rates, some MFIs 
have access to subsidized resources and donations in order 
to deal with the specificities of the microfinance market. 
However, due to the characteristics of the market, MFIs 
cannot be evaluated using only efficiency and financial 
performance metrics, as is the case with other financial 
institutions, since the higher costs and lower volumes are 
necessary in order to serve poorer customers (Gutierrez-
Nieto, Serrano-Cinca, & Molinero, 2007). 
To obtain the desired results, the institutions have 
to balance the demands of financial performance with 
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those of social performance, aiming towards operational 
self-sufficiency and investor returns, and at the same time 
enabling poorer customers to access financial system 
services in a sustainable way (Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-
Nieto, 2014). In light of the above, it can be perceived that 
MFIs face a dual situation in which financial results are 
not enough to warrant investments and the social role is 
not sustainable without returns on the costs involved. In 
this situation, MFIs are required to maximize the efficiency 
of the resources used (Piot-Lepetit & Nzongang, 2014).
2.1.1 MFI social performance.
Most MFIs have a social mission, such as reducing 
poverty, increasing female autonomy, or stimulating small 
businesses, which is always related with improving the 
quality of life of the poor (Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-
Nieto, 2014). Due to the social appeal that microfinance 
can have, many MFIs have access to lines of credit with 
more attractive interest rates, subsidies, and donations 
from people and institutions (Hermes & Lensink, 2011). 
In this context, the social performance indicators enable 
it to be verified whether the MFIs are really providing 
improvements in the quality of life of the customers and 
communities they serve. A positive result in the social 
performance indicators also gives the MFI credibility in 
the microfinance market and among investors in order 
for it to continue receiving resources (Schicks, 2014).
Socially interested investors seek to evaluate MFIs, 
since they are concerned about credit being diverted 
to less poor customers (Louis et al., 2013) or about the 
availability of credit causing adverse social effects in terms 
of heightened customer debt (Schicks, 2014). Problems 
related with microfinance have already been reported 
in various locations: in India, an increase in customer 
poverty due to excess debt has been observed (Guérin, 
Roesch, Venkatasubramanian, & Kumar, 2013); in Kenya, 
higher interest rates charged to customers are associated 
with higher default rates in communities (Kodongo & 
Kendi, 2013); in Ghana, heightened customer debt due 
to the population’s lack of financial knowledge and loans 
without any productive purpose have been reported 
(Schicks, 2014). The high cost of serving poorer customers, 
together with the pressure from donors and investors for 
the institutions to achieve economic sustainability, can 
result in higher interest rates being charged, which in 
turn can create social problems related with microfinance 
(Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014).
The literature highlights the number of active MFI 
customers (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010), the number 
of loans granted to women (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & 
Morduch, 2011), and the average values of loans granted 
(Cull et al., 2011; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010), as variables 
that are commonly used to measure the social performance 
of MFIs.
2.1.2 MFI financial performance.
In general, MFIs seek returns on their operations, 
aiming for long term sustainability. Governments, 
investors, and donors hope that independently of the legal 
form adopted MFIs can operate using the revenues derived 
from the services offered to their customers (Roberts, 
2013). It is also important for for-profit MFIs that investors 
perceive that the institutions are generating profits from 
the investments made, whether with dividends from the 
profit derived from the loan operations carried out or 
with capital gains derived from an increased valuation of 
ownership rights (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010).
In the context of microfinance, the indicators normally 
used to calculate financial performance are: return on 
assets (ROA), return on net equity (ROE), operational 
self-sufficiency and financial self-sufficiency (Strøm, 
D’Espallier, & Mersland, 2014), profitability, the level of 
MFI debt (Louis et al., 2013), the ratio between expenses 
and financial revenues, and the MFI asset portfolio 
(Sanfeliu, Royo, & Clemente, 2013).
2.1.3 MFI efficiency.
The history of microfinance shows that seeking to 
reduce operating costs is one of the ways for MFIs to 
achieve operational self-sufficiency and be able to carry 
out their role among the poor. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
some initiatives failed because they could not deal with the 
high costs of providing credit to the poorest and ended up 
channeling resources to customers that were not so poor 
(Louis et al., 2013). With increased efficiency, it is hoped 
that small MFIs can reduce their dependency on subsidies 
and donations, as well as surviving the competition with 
large banks, which have recently begun to participate in 
the microfinance market (Hermes & Lensink, 2011; Kent 
& Dacin, 2013).
Even when MFIs have donations and subsidized 
resources, reducing costs enables a reduction in the 
rates and fees charged to customers, thus reducing any 
penalization of the poorest (Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-
Nieto, 2014) and, since the availability of donations and 
lines of credit with lower costs is not unlimited, the market 
prefers those MFIs that manage to maximize the benefits 
of the resources used and favors the most efficient ones 
(Ghosh & Van Tassel, 2011). Signs of efficiency are even 
more important in the context of microfinance due to 
the low savings ability of the customers, making MFIs 
more dependent on external funds (Serrano-Cinca & 
Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014).
The relationship between the performance and legal form of microfinance institutions
R. Cont. Fin. – USP, São Paulo, v. 28, n. 75, p. 377-389, set./dez. 2017380
Works in microfinance have used some of the following 
variables to measure MFI efficiency: Gutierrez-Nieto et 
al. (2007) used the ratio between operating expenses 
and gross credit portfolio, cost per customer, employee 
productivity, and the ratio of employees to agencies; 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) used cost per client and 
the ratio of operating costs to the average gross credit 
portfolio; Louis et al. (2013) used cost per loan and the 
ratio between gross credit portfolio and total assets. 
2.2 Legal Form and MFIs
Organizations act in different spheres of human life, 
providing products and services to people. Each market 
niche presents particular determinant characteristics for 
indicating which legal form implies better results with 
lower agency costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). The particular 
characteristics of the microfinance market mean that 
some of the organizations have to deal with conflicting 
goals. Some investors expect MFIs to focus on the social 
side of the activity and keep interest rates at a threshold 
that is just enough to maintain the institution, but there 
are also investors that expect MFIs to act exclusively in 
order to maximize profits and adopt a position more 
like a traditional financial institution (Piot-Lepetit & 
Nzongang, 2014).
Today, the microfinance market is dominated by 
three different ownership structures: cooperatives, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), and for-profit 
institutions (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). If, on one hand, 
the operations of for-profit MFIs are seen as predatory 
for the microfinance market, since these institutions can 
exaggerate when charging interest in order to maintain 
returns, thus discouraging future customers who fear 
getting excessively in debt and not being able to pay 
off their loans (Roberts, 2013), on the other hand, an 
excessive focus on the social orientation can make MFIs 
unsustainable. Philanthropic MFIs often do not have the 
technology to develop more efficient processes and can lose 
resources through unprofitable investments, such as high 
risk loans resulting from failures in the credit assessment 
process, and through agents of the organization diverting 
resources, enabled by weak corporate governance policies. 
Failure in the processes and lack of efficiency are not only 
damaging to non-profit MFIs; they can compromise the 
credibility and future of the whole microfinance market 
(Servin, Lensink, & Van den Berg, 2012).
The debate in relation to the legal form of MFIs 
intensified with the transformation process of some 
NGOs into for-profit institutions in the 1990s and the 
beginning of this century. Transformed MFIs present 
improvements in their efficiency and operational self-
sufficiency indicators, apparently showing that legal 
forms geared towards profit were more appropriate for 
the microfinance market (Fernando, 2004; Ito, 2008). 
Increased efficiency and operational self-sufficiency is a 
favorable argument for the transformed institutions, not 
only because of the improvement in internal processes 
(Servin et al., 2012), but it has also been observed that 
higher self-sufficiency and efficiency rates are related 
with greater impact being made by MFIs, which through 
adopting more economical processes can serve more 
customers (Ngo, 2015). However, gains in efficiency can 
originate from discrimination against poorer customers, 
who are naturally less profitable, indicating a possible 
deviation from the social mission of transformed MFIs 
(Ito, 2008).
Non-profit MFIs would initially have lower agency 
costs to achieve their social goals, thus avoiding a 
deviation from their social mission, since, as Fama and 
Jensen (1983b) report, institutions such as NGOs and 
cooperatives would not be able to transfer excess resources 
to the owners of the institution, and as they depend on 
donations, any deviation from their social mission would 
imply greater losses and risks to the continuity of the 
institution. 
In relation to the legal forms of for-profit MFIs, these 
are classified into three types in terms of operating licenses 
and legal constraints: banks have a license to operate 
as banking institutions and can, among other financial 
services, raise funds from customers and use them to 
provide loans for other customers that need them; NBFIs 
are for-profit financial institutions characterized as not 
having a banking license and not being able to collect 
deposits from their customers, but they can offer financial 
services, such as credit and insurance services, using their 
own funds (Gupta, Yesmin, & Khan, 2013; Reserve Bank 
of India, 2015; Sufian, 2008); the rural banks in the study 
are financial institutions that are characteristic of India, 
funded by the State and by private banks, which can collect 
deposits from their customers, but unlike traditional 
banks, their operations are geographically limited by 
their license and they mainly operate in a rural region 
and provide credit to rural producers. Rural banks are 
similar to NBFIs, as these also focus on specific regions, 
unlike banks, which because they are bigger, can operate 
more widely (Cyree & Spurlin, 2012; Ibrahim, 2010). The 
lack of consensus regarding the most appropriate legal 
form for the microfinance market appears to be reflected 
in the sample studied, since no dominant legal form was 
observed, as can be noted from Table 4.
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3. METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
With the aim of studying MFIs, the study sample 
was composed of institutions registered in MixMarket. 
In the database, information on 2,294 MFIs is available 
for the period from 2007 to 2012. Of the 2,294 MFIs 
collected, MFIs without data for some of the periods were 
eliminated, leaving 304 MFIs and 1,824 observations 
composing the sample studied.
Regarding legal form, the sample is comprised of 
126 NBFIs, 107 NGOs, 36 banks, 30 cooperatives, and 
five rural banks; therefore, the group made up of other 
for-profit institutions (rural banks and NBFIs) covered 
131 institutions. The MFIs used to compose the sample 
are from 59 countries, mainly operating in Asia, in Latin 
America, and in Africa, with some in Eastern Europe. 
The five most represented countries in the sample are: 
Ecuador, India, Mexico, Honduras, and Peru, in that order.
In order to differentiate between the MFIs with regards 
to legal form, four groups were created: NGOs, credit 
cooperatives, banks, and the group made up of other 
for-profit institutions, which includes NBFIs and rural 
banks. The separation of banks from other non-profit 
institutions is due to differences regarding the business 
model adopted. Rural banks and NBFIs often only operate 
locally or regionally, whereas banks tend to operate on 
a national scale, neglecting communities that are distant 
from urban centers or needing the help of intermediaries 
in order to serve these communities (Cyree & Spurlin, 
2012).
3.2 Specification of the Model and Variables
The regression statistical technique with balanced and 
heteroskedasticity-robust panel data was used, attending 
to the result of the Breusch and Pagan test (1979). The 
study uses random effects to calculate the effect of the 
time-series panel, as this way it is possible to observe the 
effect of dummy variables that do not present any variation 
or a minimal variation over time (Torres-Reyna, 2010). 
Due to the use of dummy variables, one group is not 
specified in the model, the group made up of NBFIs and 
rural banks. Because it is the biggest group in the sample, 
it was chosen to represent when all of the dummy variables 
take a zero value and is represented by the intercept. The 
data analysis was carried out using R language (R. Core 
Team, 2014) and the PLM statistical package (Croissant 
& Millo, 2008). All in all, eight panels were formed with 
the aim of verifying the relationship between the legal 
form and performance variables of the MFIs. The model 
used is presented in equation 1:
PERit = αit + β1SIZEit + β2RSOLit + β3BANKit + β4COOPit + β5NGOit +ui + eit
in which: PER
𝑖𝑡
 represents the MFI performance variables, 
the size of the MFIs over time is represented by SIZE
𝑖𝑡
, and 
the solvency ratio of each MFI over time is represented 
by RSOL
𝑖𝑡
. The dummy variables for banks, cooperatives, 
and NGOs are represented by BANK
𝑖𝑡
, COOP
𝑖𝑡
, and 
NGO
𝑖𝑡
, respectively. The random effect for each MFI is 
represented by u
𝑖
, e
𝑖𝑡
 represents the non-observed error, 
and 𝛼𝑖𝑡 represents the intercept.
The RSOL variable was used as a control. The solvency 
ratio is used with the aim of reducing the effect of the 
2008 crisis on MFI performance, given that financial 
institutions generally perform better when they are more 
leveraged and have a lower solvency ratio, especially 
during banking crises, such as the one that occurred in 
2008, a period which is covered in the sample (Berger 
& Bouwman, 2013). MFI size was also used as a control 
variable, since larger MFIs would present efficiency gains 
from having a more developed structure and greater 
financial input (Cyree & Spurlin, 2012). The independent 
variables in the model are described in Table 1.
1
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Table 2 Dependent variables
Panel Description of the variables Abbreviation Studies 
Financial performance 
1 Return on assets. ROA Bruett et al. (2005)
2 
Operational self-sufficiency measured by the ratio between financial 
revenue and the sum of operating and financial expenses and impairment 
losses.  
OPSS Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010)
3 Profit margin. PROF  Louis et al. (2013) 
Social performance 
4 Logarithm of the number of active customers. NUC Hartarska (2005)
5 
Ratio between the average loans granted by the institution and the gross 
national product per capita of the country in which the MFI operates.
AVLG 
Cull et al. (2007); Hartarska & 
Nadolnyak (2007) 
Cost per customer 
6 
Cost per customer measured by the ratio between operating cost and 
number of customers.
CPC Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2007)
Cost of porfolio 
7 
Cost of providing credit measured by the ratio between operating cost and 
gross portfolio.
COP Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010)
Table 1 Independent variables used
Type Description of the variables Abbreviation
Dummy Binary variable representing banks. BANKti
Dummy Binary variable representing credit cooperatives. COOPti
Dummy Binary variable representing non-profit organizations. NGOti
In the model, the intercept represents the group of rural banks and non-bank financial institu-
tions.
αti
Continuous MFI size measured by the logarithm of total assets. SIZEti
Continuous MFI solvency ratio measured by the ratio between total net equity and total assets. RSOLti
Note: in every regression the same independent variables are used.
MFI = microfinance institution.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
To measure the financial performance of the 
institutions, the following variables were used: ROA, as 
it enables a comparison between for-profit and non-profit 
institutions (Bruett et al., 2005); profit margin, which 
indicates the ability of the MFIs to control costs and 
expenses and generate revenues, indicating their long-
term sustainability (Louis et al., 2013); operational self-
sufficiency, which makes it possible to observe how much 
the MFIs are able to cover their expenses with financial 
revenues (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). The operational 
self-sufficiency of the MFIs is obtained by the ratio between 
financial revenue and the sum of expenses. Financial costs, 
operating expenses, and impairment losses, which are 
inherent to credit activities, are considered as expenses 
(MixMarket, 2014).
With the aim of measuring social performance, two 
variables were used: the number of active customers, 
which is an indication of the impact of MFIs on society, 
since MFIs that serve more customers cause a greater 
social impact (Hartarska, 2005), and the average value of 
the loans divided by the gross national product per capita, 
which is a proxy indicator for the level of poverty of the 
customers that the MFI manages to serve (Cull, Demirgüç-
Kunt, & Morduch, 2007; Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007). 
The average value of the loans should consider gross 
national product per capita when different countries are 
observed, in order to avoid distortions caused by the 
income level of the people served (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 
2010).
For efficiency, cost of credit portfolio was used, which 
indicates the operating cost per unit of resource lent 
by the MFIs. The average cost per client was also used, 
which is made up of the ratio between operating costs 
and number of customers. For the cost of credit portfolio 
and cost per customer variables, the lower the result, the 
more efficient the MFIs will be (Gutierrez-Nieto et al., 
2007; Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010).
The risk of the MFI credit operations was observed 
using portfolio at risk for 30 days, which indicates the 
level of MFI customer defaults (Servin et al., 2012). Table 
2 defines, describes, and refers to the studies from which 
the dependent variables used in the study originate.
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Table 3 Correlations between the performance (ROA, OPSS, PROF, NUC, AVLG, CPC, COP, and PAR) and control (SIZE and 
RSOL) variables
  ROA OPSS PROF NUC AVLG CPC COP PAR SIZE RSOL
ROA   0.52** 0.87** 0.06** -0.02 -0.08** -0.39** -0.1** 0.09** 0.12**
OPSS 0.52**   0.52** 0.02 0.01 -0.08** -0.23** -0.08** 0.05* 0.16**
PROF 0.87** 0.52**   0.01 0.04 -0.05** -0.33** -0.14** 0.09** 0.12**
NUC 0.06** 0.02 0.01 -0.19** -0.31** -0.11** 0.01 0.75** -0.35**
AVLG -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.19**   0.55** -0.19** 0.01 0.19** -0.1**
CPC -0.08** -0.08** -0.05** -0.31** 0.55**   0.05** 0.01 0.07** 0.07**
COP -0.39** -0.23** -0.33** -0.11** -0.19** 0.05** -0.01 -0.3** 0.28**
PAR -0.1** -0.08** -0.14** 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.01   0.01 -0.01
SIZE 0.09** 0.05* 0.09** 0.75** 0.19** 0.07** -0.3** 0.01   -0.4**
RSOL 0.12** 0.16** 0.12** -0.35** -0.1** 0.07** 0.28** -0.01 -0.4**  
*, **: 10% and 5% significance, respectively. 
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Table 2 Cont.
Panel Description of the variables Abbreviation Studies 
Credit portfolio risk 
8 MFI Portfolio at risk for 30 days. PAR Servin et al. (2012)
Note: each one of the variables was used as a dependent variable in each one of the panel data regressions.
MFI = microfinance institution.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
3.3 Model Suitability Tests
With the aim of verifying the suitability of the panel 
data model, the following tests were carried out: the 
Breusch and Pagan test (1979), for heteroskedasticity, 
the Said and Dickey test (1984) (ADF test), for serial 
autocorrelation in the variables, and the Im, Pesaran, 
and Shin test (2003) (IPS test), for serial autocorrelation 
of the panels. Six panels, the period analyzed, eliminates 
problems with cross-sectional dependency and serial 
correlation (Torres-Reyna, 2010). The results for the ADF 
and IPS tests don’t indicated unit root presence.
4. RESULTS ANALYSIS
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 presents the correlations between the performance variables and the variables used in the regression as 
a control.
The correlation results presented in Table 3 show 
that the number of customers served by a MFI is highly 
correlated with its size, with a correlation of 0.75. Other 
correlations with higher absolute values than 0.4 were: 
cost per customer and average loans (0.55), ROA and 
operational self-sufficiency (0.52), ROA and profit (0.87), 
and profit and operational self-sufficiency (0.52).
The positive correlation between cost per customer 
and average loans was expected, since the high cost 
per customer is one of the reasons MFIs avoid poorer 
customers and deviate from their social mission (Serrano-
Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014). The negative correlation 
between cost of credit portfolio and ROA (-0.39) also 
bears mentioning; the result may indicate that reducing 
costs is related with MFI financial self-sufficiency, which 
is consistent with Roberts (2013).
Table 4 shows the values of the means, minimum 
values, maximum values, and the standard deviation 
of the performance variables, the control variables, the 
variable that represents the group made up of NBFIs and 
rural banks, and the dummy variables that represent 
cooperatives, banks, and NGOs. According to the t 
test (Student, 1908), the means are significant to 95% 
confidence. The group of NBFIs and rural banks is not 
represented by a dummy variable and is presented only 
for comparison. 
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The values of the descriptive statistics enable it to be 
observed that the mean cost per customer is US$ 205.95, 
but some institutions manage to achieve values lower than 
US$ 10.00, such as BWDA Finance, Adhikar, and Sarala, 
which operate in India.
It is possible to perceive that, on average, the MFIs 
manage to generate returns on assets of 2% with a 
maximum of up to 37%. The cost of credit portfolio is, 
on average, 23% of gross portfolio, but some MFIs operate 
with much higher costs, spending more than twice what 
they loan only to maintain their operations.
4.2 Main Results
The results of the multiple regressions are presented 
in Table 5. Then the results for the financial performance, 
social performance, and efficiency indicators and the 
quality of the credit portfolios of the MFIs studied are 
discussed.
Table 4 Means, minimum and maximum values, and standard deviations of the performance variables (ROA, OPSS, PROF, 
NUC, AVLG, CPC, COP, and PAR), of the control variables (SIZE and RSOL), of the variables related with the legal forms (BANK, 
COOPERATIVE, and NGO), and the group represented by the intercept of the regressions (RURAL BANK and NBFIs)
  Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
ROA 0.02 -0.97 0.37 0.08
OPSS 1.18 0.15 7.20 0.40
PROF 0.08 -5.84 0.86 0.37
NUC 9.92 4.51 15.72 1.82
AVLG 0.54 0.01 10.24 0.80
CPC 205.95 1.00 7,610.00 353.05
COP 0.23 0.01 2.15 0.19
PAR 0.06 0.00 7.11 0.24
SIZE 16.66 12.00 22.00 1.72
RSOL 0.31 -1.04 1.00 0.22
BANK 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.32
COOP 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.30
NGO 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.48
RURAL BANK and NBFIs 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.50
Note: according to the t test (Student, 1908), the means are significant to 95% confidence.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
Table 5 Regression results
Dependent variables
ROA OPSS PROF NUC AVLG CPC COP PAR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
SIZE
0.014*** 0.038*** 0.07*** 0.484*** 0.04*** 24.60*** -0.04*** -0.004
(0.002) (0.009) (0.008) (0.013) (0.013) (5.92) (0.003) (0.01)
RSOL
0.067*** 0.286*** 0.41*** -0.52*** -0.005 161.4*** 0.063*** -0.001
(0.011) (0.057) (0.052) (0.072) (0.076) (33.109) (0.02) (0.03)
BANK
-0.018* -0.04 -0.035 0.037 0.68*** 39.828 0.046 0.04**
(0.01) (0.055) (0.043) (0.21) (0.133) (62.606) (0.03) (0.02)
COOP
0.018* 0.04 0.14*** -1.46*** 0.40*** 25.844 -0.17*** -0.009
(0.01) (0.058) (0.044) (0.224) (0.142) (66.713) (0.032) (0.02)
NGO
0.024*** 0.092** 0.10*** -0.043 -0.015 -18.268 -0.06*** -0.012
(0.007) (0.038) (0.029) (0.145) (0.092) (43.157) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant
-0.25*** 0.422*** -1.2*** 2.173*** -0.282 -254.2** 0.962*** 0.124
(0.031) (0.163) (0.141) (0.247) (0.24) (106.177) (0.061) (0.08)
Observations 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824 1824
R² 0.046 0.021 0.056 0.477 0.029 0.02 0.103 0.003
R² ajusted 0.046 0.021 0.056 0.476 0.029 0.02 0.103 0.003
F test
(df = 5; 1,452)
17.48*** 7.719*** 21.5*** 332.1*** 11.0*** 7.399*** 41.82*** 1.117
*, **, ***: 10%, 5%, and 1% significance, respectively.
Source: Elaborated by the author.
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4.2.1 Financial performance.
The results found show that NGOs and cooperatives 
have a higher ROA and banks have a lower ROA than 
rural banks and NBFIs (represented by the intercept). 
The higher return of the NGOs and cooperatives, when 
compared to the banks, NBFIs, and rural banks, coincides 
with the result from Galema, Lensink, and Spierdijk 
(2011). Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) did not find any 
significant difference between the ROAs of the legal 
forms.
The return of the NGOs and cooperatives could be 
explained by the improvement observed in the management 
and transparency of the non-profit institutions and the 
increased competition for donations between the socially 
orientated MFIs, which is also seen as a predominant 
factor for NGOs and cooperatives to develop processes 
that raise ROAs. This way socially orientated MFIs show 
the market that they are becoming more self-sufficient 
(Mersland & Strøm, 2008; Tucker & Miles, 2004).
The competition for market niches with more 
customers is a factor that may explain the lower rates of 
return of banks and of some other for-profit MFIs. The 
for-profit MFIs may be focusing their efforts on more 
competitive markets, with the hope that the higher number 
of customers compensates for the low returns. In contrast, 
serving less competitive markets may be more interesting 
for NGOs and cooperatives, as they would have the social 
argument of bringing microfinance to customers who 
would not otherwise be served (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
& Morduch, 2014); but it is worth observing that the 
ROA may be a sign that the NGOs and cooperatives are 
exaggerating in the commercial character when they take 
microfinance to distant communities. 
 Size of assets is directly related with MFI 
profitability, thus agreeing with the results of Hartarska 
(2005) and Mersland and Strøm (2009). The relationship 
between ROA and size of MFIs may be explained by the 
way the institutions grow; assets appear to grow faster than 
the number of customers, that is, the return may originate 
from loans that are larger and proportionally cheaper 
and more profitable for the MFIs. The consolidation 
process also allows MFIs to invest in technologies that 
can reduce costs and increase return (Hartarska, Shen, & 
Mersland, 2013). The results of the study reinforce the 
idea that bigger MFIs provide, on average, larger loans 
and have lower costs per unit of credit, reinforcing the 
relationship between consolidation, larger loans, lower 
costs, and higher returns.
The result appears to show that NGOs have greater 
operational self-sufficiency than rural banks and NBFIs, 
which diverges from Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010), 
but converges with the work of Hartarska (2005) and 
Mersland and Strøm (2009), who observed that NGOs are 
more self-sufficient than some private MFIs. The result 
may be related with the lower cost of the credit portfolio 
and higher returns of the NGOs and cooperatives for the 
sample studied. The results also indicate that larger MFIs 
manage to become more self-sufficient, thus agreeing 
with the study from Mersland and Strøm (2009).
The results obtained show that non-profit MFI 
profitability was higher than that of NBFIs and rural banks, 
which may derive from pressures from investors and 
governments interested in operational self-sufficiency and 
in expanding the number of customers served. This may be 
making NGOs and cooperatives adopt more commercial 
practices that, allied with the advantage of operating with 
financial benefits and without any of the legal constraints 
of profit-orientated financial institutions, would result in 
greater financial performance. The profitability of these 
institutions is a warning sign if we consider that some 
MFIs are accused of practicing high interest rates and 
credit and collection policies that verge on being abusive, 
which in the case of socially-orientated MFIs could be 
mitigated by reducing profits so that they do not diverge 
from their social mission (Bédécarrats, Bastiaensen, 
& Doligez, 2012; Serrano-Cinca & Gutiérrez-Nieto, 
2014). In this context, it could be questioned whether 
expansion through retaining surplus earnings is the best 
solution when assimilation or merger with other financial 
institutions is also an option.
In this paper, it was observed that all of the financial 
performance indicators were directly significant with 
relation to the solvency ratio. Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
report that a financial institution’s financial performance 
is directly related to the proportion of own capital to total 
assets, especially in times of crisis, such as the 2008 crisis, 
which is contemplated in the sample, when they suffer 
more shocks related with levels of deposits, debtor default, 
and low availability of creditors’ capital. The arguments 
that support the relationship between a higher solvency 
ratio and higher financial performance are access to 
cheaper funds and the preference for some types of more 
profitable customers that maintain longer relationships 
with the financial institutions, since, in both cases, a high 
solvency ratio is seen by the market as a sign of lower risk 
and favors the institution. It is unlikely that customers are 
able to assess the capital structure of MFIs; therefore it 
seems more reasonable to explain the relationship between 
the solvency and financial performance of the institutions 
via the reduction in risk and access to cheaper funds.
The results for the financial performance variables 
showed that, in general, NGOs and cooperatives have 
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higher returns, higher profits, and greater operational 
self-sufficiency than companies that adopt other types 
of legal form.
4.2.2 Social performance.
The results found show that the NBFIs and rural banks 
serve more customers than the cooperatives and diverge a 
little from Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010), since, due to the 
statistically non-significant result for NGOs and banks, 
it was not possible to carry out the same comparisons. 
However, in his paper he observes that for-profit MFIs 
are, on average, larger than non-profit MFIs such as 
cooperatives. In this sense, the result found indicates 
that the fact that cooperatives serve fewer customers than 
NBFIs and rural banks may be due to the greater size of 
the for-profit institutions in relation to the correlation 
between asset size and number of customers served, 
which as can be seen in Table 3, is 0.75 for the sample 
studied. It is also observed that larger MFIs provide, on 
average, larger loans, agreeing with the result from Cull et 
al. (2007) and being an indication that when MFIs grow, 
they serve less poor customers.
The ratio between own capital and assets was inversely 
significant with the number of customers, indicating 
that more financially leveraged MFIs manage to serve 
more customers. One possible explanation is based on 
the fact that the availability of subsidized lines of credit 
is an incentive for MFIs to meet their social goals and 
one of these consists of causing the maximum impact in 
the local society and serving the greatest number of poor 
people possible (Ghosh & Van Tassel, 2011).
The cooperatives present lower average loans than the 
banks and the results coincide with Tchakoute-Tchuigoua 
(2010). The results found may be related with the greater 
social orientation of cooperatives when compared to 
banks: cooperatives can provide smaller loans and serve 
poorer and less profitable customers because they have 
access to cheaper and subsidized funds (Serrano-Cinca 
& Gutiérrez-Nieto, 2014).
4.2.3 Efficiency, costs, and risk.
In relation to cost of credit portfolio, the NGOs and 
cooperatives presented lower costs when compared with 
the for-profit MFIs, except banks, which did not present 
any statistical significance that allows for comparison. 
The results coincide with Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2007) 
and Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010). A portion of the higher 
costs of the rural banks and NBFIs may be related with the 
lack of subsidized lines of credit and donations, increasing 
the cost of capital for these MFIs (Ghosh & Van Tassel, 
2011). Another possibility is that the business model of 
for-profit MFIs, probably based on products and services 
from the traditional financial system, is less efficient for 
the microfinance market that that developed by NGOs 
and cooperatives, which adopt practices based on local 
customs and partnerships, thus reducing the cost of their 
operations. Adapting the traditional financial system 
services is difficult, given that poorer customers may not 
be able to cover all of the costs involved, with adaptations 
being necessary to “deliver more, costing less”; that is, 
adapting to the needs of the consumer market (Gonzalez, 
Diniz, & Pozzebon, 2015).
In the “cost per customer” variable, it was not possible 
to observe any differences regarding the legal forms; the 
dummy variables for NGOs, cooperatives, and banks did 
not present any statistical significance. MFI size is directly 
related with costs per client, but inversely related with cost 
of credit portfolio. The result appears to indicate that the 
big financial institutions are perhaps not accessible for the 
poorest customers and distant communities traditionally 
avoided due to the difficulty of geographical access and 
higher operating costs (Soares & Melo Sobrinho, 2008). 
The infrastructure needed to operate in more distant 
locations and with poorer customers appears to be 
economically unviable for large financial institutions; in 
this case, an improved relationship between MFIs and local 
partnerships may represent a way of avoiding costs. The 
banking intermediation model in which local businesses 
play the role of banking correspondents is an example to 
be observed by MFIs in expansion; with the knowledge of 
local agents and support of a robust communications and 
information technology infrastructure, the model allows 
large banks to operate in distant locations without having 
to assume the cost of a dedicated local infrastructure 
(Diniz, Pozzebon, & Jayo, 2009; Gonzalez et al., 2015).
The solvency ratio was significant for the two cost 
variables, indicating that less leveraged MFIs have higher 
costs per customer and higher costs per unit of credit. 
The possibility is that a more costly operation that favors 
poorer and more expensive customers makes more 
creditors’ resources available to MFIs and enables them 
to have a more financially leveraged structure. Ghosh and 
Van Tassel (2011) report that the most socially orientated 
MFIs are the ones that receive more subsidized funds and 
donations. In this case, the costs would be a reflection of 
social actions and the leveraged structure an incentive 
and a need for the activities of these MFIs.
With regards to the quality of the credit portfolio for 
30 days, only the binary variable of the cooperatives was 
significant in the model, with a negative result, which 
does not enable comparison between the legal forms. 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) found that NGOs and 
cooperatives have a higher risk, but Chakravarty and 
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Pylypiv (2015) found that NGOs and cooperatives have a 
lower risk, showing that there is no consensus regarding 
the effect of the legal form for MFI credit portfolio risk. 
However, the average found by Tchakoute-Tchuigoua 
(2010) for the PAR variable (0.064) is similar to that found 
for the sample studied (0.06), indicating that low credit 
portfolio risk may be a characteristic that is inherent to 
the microfinance market as a whole.
4.2.4 Legal form and performance.
The results found for the cooperatives show that they 
present the second highest return, the highest profit, the 
lowest average for loans granted, and the lowest cost per 
unit of credit granted, however they were also shown to 
serve a smaller number of customers when the group was 
compared to other legal forms. The NGOs obtained the 
highest return, the greatest operational self-sufficiency, 
the second highest profit, and the second lowest cost of 
credit portfolio, which may be attributed to the ease of 
access that MFIs with a greater social orientation have 
to subsidized lines of credit, which does not necessarily 
guarantee benefits for the customers, as some institutions 
adopt inefficient practices, wasting resources that could 
guarantee more loans to customers (Hermes & Lensink, 
2011). The results of the study themselves reinforce this 
fear, since it was not possible to observe that the financial 
performance of the NGOs is reflected in lower average 
loans or a greater number of customers served; that is, 
in greater social performance.
The banks obtained a lower ROA and higher average 
loans. Cyree and Spurlin (2012) note that rural banks 
are more efficient and obtain higher profits than large 
banks when they operate in rural communities. Roberts 
(2013) highlights that an excessive orientation towards 
profit can be prejudicial to the financial performance of 
MFIs in a market in which investments and subsidies 
favor institutions that are more orientated towards social 
results. Gonzalez et al. (2015) speak of the importance of 
the right use of local partners and information technology 
to create intermediaries or banking correspondents, 
aiming to reduce the costs of the activities of large banking 
institutions by reducing the infrastructure needed, as 
well as adapting services and products to the poorest, 
by favoring the local knowledge and practices already 
adopted by this clientele.
With regards to the group made up of NBFIs and 
rural banks, this obtained higher average returns than the 
banks, but lower ones than the NGOs and cooperatives. 
The profit was also lower than that of the NGOs and 
cooperatives. These institutions were shown to serve more 
customers, even when facing higher costs per unit loaned 
than NGOs and cooperatives and with lower financial 
performance. More studies are thus needed to identify 
how NBFIs and rural banks manage to serve more clients 
in the microfinance market.
The results for the bank group are an indication that 
the traditional structure of the financial institutions may 
not be suitable for the microfinance market. It may be that, 
as Gonzalez et al. (2015) report, adaptations are needed 
in the financial services offered and in the infrastructure, 
seeking to reduce costs without preventing the poorest 
customers from having access to the financial institutions 
and their services. In contrast, even with higher financial 
results than other MFIs, it was not possible to affirm 
that NGOs use surplus funds to serve a greater number 
of customers or provide smaller loans, thus weakening 
the arguments related to social action. In this context, a 
combination of more modern financial service practices 
and less formal socially-orientated financial institution 
practices may serve as the basis for a business model that 
meets the needs of the poorest and serves as a model for 
the microfinance market.
5. FINAL REMARKS
In this paper, it was shown that larger MFIs obtained 
higher returns, greater self-sufficiency rates, higher profits, 
served a greater number of customers, and had a lower cost 
of credit portfolio than smaller institutions. Thus, mergers 
and assimilations may be an interesting alternative for 
MFIs for two reasons: a reduction in the costs of smaller 
MFIs, which could adopt more efficient technologies and 
practices that allow for economies of scale (Hartarska et 
al., 2013); and taking advantage of the structure already 
established by smaller MFIs, especially those that operate 
in more distant locations, thus assimilating the knowledge, 
relationships, structures, and practices, in order to serve 
this clientele (Gonzalez et al., 2015; Hartarska et al., 2013; 
Jeon & Menicucci, 2011).
It was also observed that cooperatives, NBFIs, and rural 
banks are the legal forms that can balance the demands for 
financial performance, seeking to guarantee a return on 
the investments carried out and the financial sustainability 
of the organization, with the demands of investors for 
social results. The results found are an indication that 
cooperatives, NBFIs, and rural banks may be the most 
appropriate legal forms for the microfinance market, 
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showing that, as foreseen by Fama and Jensen (1983b), the 
specificities of each activity favor some forms of ownership 
over others.
The results are indications that investors, donors, and 
governments should focus investments and incentives 
on larger MFIs that adopt the legal form of NBFIs, rural 
banks, and cooperatives, as well as encouraging mergers 
and acquisitions between small and large institutions 
specialized in microcredit and microfinance.
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